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Previous researchers have demonstrated that different emotions colour 
cognitive processes in specific ways, and that even subliminally presented emotional 
cues, such as negative and positive facial expressions, influence cognitive processes. 
However, few have investigated the automatic and unconscious effects of emotional 
cues on cognitive processes in a way that goes beyond valence. To fill this research 
gap, this study investigated the impact of subliminally presented emotional cues on 
the cognitive process of appraisal by subliminally presenting angry and sad facial 
expressions to participants and examining their impact on the participants’ causal 
appraisals. Analysis revealed that the appraisals had been influenced by 
unconsciously activated emotion-representations in a manner in accordance with 
appraisal theories of emotion. Participants primed with angry faces were more likely 
to appraise other individuals and less likely to appraise interpersonal factors as the 
agency for negative events compared to those primed with sad faces. As these 
effects were confined to negative events, they suggest the existence of a valence-
congruent effect. Subjective feelings of anger and sadness were not affected by the 
facial primes. Theoretical importance of these findings, the limitations of the study, 
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In a landmark study, Zajonc (1980) demonstrated that basic affective 
reactions, such as preferences regarding individual likes and dislikes, can be 
automatically evoked by minimal stimulation, such as subliminally presented facial 
expressions and affective adjectives. The multitude of subsequent research into 
automatic unconscious affective reactions triggered by Zajonc’s findings has 
provided evidence that various cognitive functions can be affected by subliminally 
presented emotional primes (e.g., Chartrand, Van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006; Murphy 
& Zajonc, 1993; Stapel, Koomen, & Ruys, 2002). Specifically, researchers have 
found that subliminally presenting positive words (e.g., music), as compared to 
subliminally presenting negative words (e.g., bombs), produces positive 
interpretations in subsequent unrelated tasks, including defining homographs, 
categorizing ambiguous objects, and making judgments regarding personality traits 
(Ferguson, Bargh, & Nayak, 2005). Likewise, many researchers have found that 
individuals exposed to subliminally happy facial expressions rather than 
subliminally angry facial expressions tend to rate subsequently presented news 
messages as more positive, as well as show more trustworthiness and memorize 
more positive messages (Ravaja, Kallinen, Saari, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2004). 
However, such research has only demonstrated the existence of unconscious 
valence-based effects (i.e., cognitive processes varying as a function of subliminally 
presented positive versus negative primes). No research has examined whether these 
unconscious effects could be emotion-specific or, in other words, whether 
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differential effects on cognitive processes could be evoked by subliminal emotional 
primes of the same valence.  
The existence of unconscious emotion-specific effects is theoretically 
feasible. Emotions are considered an adaptive system designed to rapidly extract 
emotional information or signals beyond global valence and automatically activate 
corresponding responses to cope with various challenges. Partially supporting this 
perspective, numerous researchers have demonstrated that emotions of the same 
valence can activate different cognitive functions (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & 
Kramer, 1994; DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Keltner, Ellsworth, & 
Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). For instance, Raghunathan and Pham 
(1990) found that individuals induced to feel sad tend to make more high-risk 
decisions, while individuals made to feel anxious tend to make more low-risk 
decisions. Because these researchers induced conscious emotional experiences, they 
made no demonstration of whether the effects of emotions or emotional stimuli on 
cognitive functions could be subliminally elicited. Thus, the present study aimed to 
fill this research gap by providing the first evidence demonstrating the unconscious 
emotion-specific effects of emotional stimuli on cognitive processes. By doing so, 
this study broadened research into the effects of emotions on cognitions by 
demonstrating that emotional stimuli of the same valence can unconsciously and 
differently influence the cognitive process of appraisal. The findings of this study 
also should further support appraisal theories of emotions by demonstrating that 
appraisals are influenced by subliminally presented emotional stimuli in a manner 
predicted by appraisal theories. 
Appraisal theories of emotion propose that each emotion is associated with a 
unique pattern of cognitive appraisals (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). For example, the 
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appraisal theory of emotion associates sadness with appraisals of unpleasantness and 
under situational control and associates anger with appraisals of unpleasantness and 
brought by other individuals (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Drawing from appraisal 
theories, this study tested the hypothesis that a subliminally activated anger 
representation would facilitate attributions to other individuals but that a 
subliminally activated sadness representation would facilitate attributions to 
uncontrollable interpersonal circumstances. 
 
The Adaptive Emotional System 
Emotions are posited to be a multi-component adaptive system designed to 
address specific environmental contingencies (Ekman, 1984; Frijda, 1988; Keltner 
& Gross, 1999; Scherer, 1984). This emotional system should be capable of 
activating distinctive responses that accord with the unique challenges posed by 
different situations. However, in circumstances that demand a rapid response, little 
time is available to engage in controlled cognitive processes necessary to develop 
and implement an action plan. In such situations, it is more adaptive to react 
automatically, even if awareness is momentarily sidelined for an evolutionarily or 
culturally scripted response to be activated. 
This functional perspective on emotions holds two critical implications for 
research into emotion. One implication is that an emotional system should be 
sufficiently sophisticated to rapidly extract fine-grained information signifying 
specific emotional stimuli (e.g., facial expressions and voice) such that a response 
tailored to the stimuli can be made. An adaptive system with this level of 
sophistication should not only be capable of discriminating information by valence 
but also be sensitive to the detailed differences among emotional stimuli of the same 
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valence (e.g., sadness, fear, and anger). Such sensitivity to the incoming stimuli at 
the emotion-specific level allows output responses associated with specific emotions 
to be elicited rather than responses associated with broad positive or negative affect. 
This sensitivity may be especially important in differentiating between negative 
emotional information. For example, whereas sadness-related information could 
signal misfortune, which in turn could elicit empathic responses, fear-related 
information could suggest danger, which in turn could elicit a flight-or-fight 
response. Appropriate responses should be rapid and automatic in order to aid 
survival. The other implication is that unconscious emotional responses are possible 
(Lazarus, 1991; Zajonc, 1980). In support of this implication, research has shown 
that emotional responses  (e.g., cognitive processes, autonomic responses, 
communicative expressions, and subjective experiences) can be activated by mere 
exposure to subliminally presented affective stimuli (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), even 
without conscious experience of the corresponding emotions (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004).  
These implications in turn suggest that responses associated with specific 
emotions, including appraisals, can be activated by emotional cues below conscious 
thresholds although the prevailing view is that subliminally presented stimuli cannot 
extract more than basic valence-based emotional responses (Murphy, 2001; Zajonc, 
2000).  
 
Effects of Emotion on Cognition 
Research has examined the impact of emotions on a remarkable array of 
cognitive processes. Compared to negative emotions, positive emotions are not just 
more likely to produce positive attitudinal judgments of individuals and non-human 
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objects (e.g., Forgas & Moylan, 1987; Friedman, Rubin, Jacobson, & Clore, 1978; 
Gouaux, 1971; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978) but also more likely to evoke 
stereotypic responses (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994), endorsement of 
peripheral cues in persuasion (Mackie & Worth, 1989), usage of scripts (Bless et al., 
1996) and abstract categories (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Isen & Daubman, 1984), and 
correspondence biases (Forgas, 1998). In contrast, negative emotions, particularly 
sadness, are more positively associated with analytical thinking (Melton, 1995), 
change in attitudes based on argument strength (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 
1990), and usage of diagnostic information in judgment and decision making 
(Edwards & Weary, 1993; Hildebrand-Saints & Weary, 1989). 
However, these studies have only revealed how cognitive functions might 
differ as a function of affective valence (i.e., the effects of positive versus negative 
affect on cognitive processes). Emotions are known to be more complex, with each 
emotion associated with distinct cognitive functions ( Ekman, 1984; Roseman, 1984; 
Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tomkins, 1962). Further, the perspective 
that individual emotions are evolutionarily scripted with unique adaptive responses 
(Frijda, 1988; Keltner & Gross, 1999) implies that the cognitive consequences of 
specific emotions should differ, even if these emotions do not vary in valence. 
Supporting this idea, emotions of the same valence (e.g., sadness and anger) have 
been found to produce different effects on, for example, causal judgments (Keltner 
et al., 1993), likelihood estimates (DeSteno et al., 2000), stereotypic responses 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard et al., 1994), risk perceptions (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, 
& Small, 2005; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 
2001), systematic versus heuristic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001), and 
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intergroup judgments (Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009; DeSteno, 
Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). 
The emotions in all these studies, however, were manipulated by using 
conscious emotion-induction techniques (e.g., recalling personal experiences, 
reading vignettes, listening to music, and watching films) in which participants 
could assess their emotions, and even locate their sources. Therefore, their findings 
only revealed that emotions that are consciously experienced can produce residual 
effects on cognitive processes, not whether emotion-representations can be 
unconsciously primed and still influence cognitive processes while remaining 
inaccessible to awareness.  
There are theoretical reasons to expect that subliminally primed emotion-
representations can affect cognitive processes. First, the effects of emotional primes 
on cognitive processes can be unintentional, unconscious, and often uncontrollable 
(Bargh, 1994). Emotions and their cognitive concomitants are associatively 
represented in memory such that the presence of a matching cue can activate the 
emotion-cognition network (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Lang, 1993; Leventhal, 
1982), with repeated co-activation making the process increasingly automatic. Over 
time, activation of the network can be initiated even with subliminal cues, setting off 
the same emotion-to-cognition sequence as would a conscious operation, but 
without awareness or deliberate control (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This implies 
that subliminally presented emotional primes can automatically activate specific 
cognitive processes. 
Second, research has provided empirical evidence of unconscious emotion-
to-cognition processes. In one study, participants subliminally exposed to positive 
prime words exhibited less systematic processing but more heuristic processing than 
7 
 
those subliminally exposed to negative prime words (Chartrand et al., 2006). 
Another study found that subliminal presentations of happy faces produced more 
favourable evaluation of novel targets than subliminal presentations of angry or sad 
faces (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Stapel & Koomen, 2006; Stapel et al., 2002). These 
findings have been corroborated by studies showing that parallel neurological 
activation is elicited by subliminally presented affective facial primes. For example, 
subliminally presented fear faces have been found to lead to not only more negative 
evaluations but also activation of larger occipital P1 potentials, which are usually 
enhanced by threatening visual stimuli, as compared to subliminally presented 
happy facial primes (Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008).  
However, despite their impressive demonstrations of the unconscious effects 
of emotional primes on various cognitive processes, these studies only compared the 
effects of positive emotional primes to negative emotional primes, and none 
investigated whether such cognitive processes can also be discriminately influenced 
by subliminally presented cues associated with emotions of the same valence. 
This research gap calls for investigation into emotion-specific cognitive 
effects and unconscious elicitations of emotional responses. To maintain a state of 
unconscious awareness during investigation, subliminal priming is used to ensure 
that participants have no awareness of the primes or their influence on cognitive 
responses. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only two studies came closest to 
examining the existence of unconscious emotion-specific cognitive effects. Ruys 
and Stapel (2008b) examined the effects of subliminally presented pictorial cues 
related to fear and disgust, but did not find evidence of the differentiated activation 
of fear and disgust concepts (in a word-fragment task). Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and 
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Fitzsimons (2007) found that subliminally presented guilt primes elicited fewer 
indulgence behaviours (allotting money for personal consumption) but more helping 
behaviours (assisting a charity) than subliminally presented sadness primes. 
Although Zemack-Rugar et al. provided important evidence of the existence of 
unconscious emotion-specific behavioural effects, their study did not provide 
evidence of the existence of unconscious emotion-specific cognitive effects, such as 
effects on appraisals. 
To address this lack of evidence regarding emotion-specific effects, this 
research examined whether subliminally presented anger-related and sadness-related 
cues can discriminately affect appraisals associated with anger and sadness, 
respectively. The following section reviews the literature regarding appraisal 
theories and discusses the predictions regarding the emotion-specific effect of 
emotional stimuli on appraisals. 
 
Appraisal Theories and Automatic Appraisal Processes 
Although valence is by far the strongest differentiator of emotions (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), models based on valence are unable to make fine distinctions 
among emotions of the same valence. Specifically, valence-based models can 
predict how positive emotions and negative emotions differently colour subsequent 
cognitive processes or behaviours but cannot predict the differential effects of 
emotions of the same valence. Because they can predict how different emotions of 
the same valence (e.g., anger versus sadness) might influence distinctive cognitive 




Although there are several different appraisal theories in the literature1, they 
all agree on the fundamental proposition that each emotion is activated by and 
associated with a specific pattern of appraisal dimensions, including pleasantness 
(how pleasant/unpleasant the stimulus is), control (how much control one has over 
the stimulus), agency (who or what is responsible for causing the stimulus), certainty 
(how certain/uncertain the future is), and moral violation (whether the stimulus 
violates moral or social rules). While valence can only differentiate between positive 
and negative emotions as a whole, it is only by appraisal of these additional 
dimensions, such as agency and certainty, that one can differentiate a variety of 
emotions (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). For example, anger can be provoked when events are 
appraised as undesirable and caused by other individuals (i.e., the agency is other 
individuals) and sadness can be elicited by appraising the same undesirable events as 
caused by uncontrollable impersonal circumstances (i.e., the agency is the situation). 
Numerous studies have shown that specific patterns of appraisals can 
activate corresponding emotional responses, as predicted by appraisal theories 
(Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 1991; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 
1996). For instance, when asked to recall negative experiences caused by another 
person, individuals are more likely to report feeling anger; when asked to recall 
negative events caused by nonhuman factors, they tend to report feeling sadness; 
and when asked to recall negative events caused by the self, they tend to report 
feeling guilt (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). Supportive evidence for these phenomena 
has been obtained in both laboratory conditions (Smith & Lazarus, 1993) and 
                                                            
1 Not all appraisal theories agree regarding which appraisal dimensions are important for particular 
emotions (Moors, 2009; Scherer, 1999). 
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naturalistic environments (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Tong 
et al., 2005, 2007).  
Just as appraisals can elicit specific emotions, emotions can activate specific 
appraisals. In one study, Keltner et al.(1993) induced feelings of sadness or anger 
among the participants either by having them read anger- or sadness-inducing 
vignettes or by having them form the corresponding angry or sad facial expressions. 
Those participants induced to fear anger, either by reading a vignette or forming the 
corresponding facial expression, were more likely to appraise subsequent unrelated 
events as caused by other individuals, whereas those participants induced to feel 
sadness were more likely to appraise them as caused by uncontrollable situational 
factors. In another research, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that participants 
induced to feel fearful by means of recalling past fearful experiences were more 
likely to perceive upcoming events as uncertain and make pessimistic predictions 
than those who were induced to feel angry. Lerner and Keltner’s findings supported 
the supposition of appraisal theories regarding the differences between fear and 
anger on the appraisal dimension of certainty that people feeling fear tend to 
perceive less certainty and those feeling angry tend to perceive more certainty. 
These studies indicate that conscious emotional experiences can induce an 
appraisal tendency that pervades different situations. That is, the appraisal of an 
event is systematically affected by carry-over effects from a previous emotional 
experience. Because appraisal theories postulate fine differences in appraisals 
between emotions of the same valence, such as the difference in agency between 
anger and sadness, the effects of emotions on appraisals as predicted by appraisal 
theories include not only valence-based effects but also emotion-specific effects. 
Therefore, the appraisal tendency, which is a consequence of a previous emotion, is 
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richer than a simple valence-based evaluation, as it also incorporates complex 
appraisal dimensions (e.g., agency) associated with that emotion.  
Appraisal theorists do not only regard appraisals as consciously performed 
processes. In fact, one consensus among the many appraisal theorists is that 
emotion-related appraisal processes are predominantly rapid and unconscious 
(Frijda, 1993; Scherer, 2004; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; Smith & 
Kirby, 2000; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Arnold’s (1960) conceptualization of 
appraisals as “direct, immediate, [and] intuitive” evaluations influenced subsequent 
theorists, most of whom argue that appraisals can be automatically activated. For 
example, Smith and Kirby (2000) proposed that appraisals can be efficiently and 
often unconsciously activated by priming and associative processes (see also Clore 
& Ortony, 2000; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). Emerging evidence also indicates that 
simple appraisals, such as appraisals of valence and motivational congruence, can be 
computed online in an automatic manner (Grandjean & Scherer, 2008; Moors & De 
Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004).  
Although numerous studies have demonstrated that appraisals can be 
influenced by conscious emotional experiences, none has determined whether 
specific appraisals can also be automatically elicited when emotion-representations 
are activated unconsciously. In fact, this defect is emblematic of appraisal research 
in general. Except for a small number of studies that examined automatic appraisal 
activation (Grandjean & Scherer, 2008; Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors et al., 
2004), most appraisal studies have neglected researching automatic appraisal-
emotion processes, although appraisal theorists have posited their existence (e.g., 
Ekman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; also see Smith & Kirby, 2000, for an in-depth account 
of automatic appraisal processes). Research is clearly needed to determine whether 
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emotions can affect appraisals in the absence of individual cognizance of any 
emotional feelings or their antecedents, as predicted by appraisal theories. This 
study aims to conduct just such research. 
 
Summary and Overview of the Present Research 
Current understanding of emotions as an adaptive system implies that this 
system should be able to automatically extract information from a situation beyond 
simply valence and elicit emotion-specific responses, even when this emotion-
related information is subliminally presented. However, previous studies that found 
evidence of emotion-specific cognitive effects did not investigate unconscious 
effects, while studies that found evidence of unconscious cognitive effects did not 
investigate emotion-specific effects (e.g., Chartrand et al., 2006; Murphy & Zajonc, 
1993; Stapel et al., 2002). 
Appraisal theories of emotion predict that emotions of the same valence 
might activate distinctive and specific cognitive processes. Although previous 
studies have demonstrated the effects of conscious emotional feelings on appraisals 
(Keltner et al., 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), no study has examined whether the 
emotion-specific effects on appraisals could be unconsciously elicited by 
subliminally presented emotional primes. To fill this research gap, the present study 
aimed to provide the first evidence of the existence of unconscious emotion-specific 
cognitive effects on appraisals. To do so, the researcher conducted two experiments 
manipulating emotion-related information and agency appraisals as dependent 
variables to determine whether subliminal presentations of anger and sadness stimuli 
would differentially activate the corresponding agency appraisals. The researcher 
selected the emotions of anger and sadness for analysis for two primary reasons. 
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First, it is well recognized that the dimension of agency is a central discriminator 
between anger and sadness (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Keltner et al., 1993; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). This consensus allows for predictions of differences regarding 
appraisals of agency as a function of these two emotions. Second, recognition of 
anger and sadness is a universal (Ekman, 1993; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
Participants were asked to evaluate several Korean words and as they were 
doing so, they were subliminally primed with angry or sad faces. Next, they were 
asked to describe what they thought were the causes of several events in an open-
ended format. After they had done so, they were asked to rate the degree to which 
they were experiencing feelings of anger or sadness. Drawing from appraisal 
theories of emotion, the following hypotheses were proposed: subliminally activated 
anger representations would elicit more Agency-Others appraisals than subliminally 
activated sadness representations; conversely, subliminally activated sadness 
representations would elicit more Agency-Situation appraisals than subliminally 
activated anger representations. Past research indicates that subliminally presented 
emotion-related stimuli tend not to affect self-reported emotions (e.g., Ruys & 
Stapel, 2008b; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005); Zemack-Rugar, 
Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2007). Hence, it was also predicted, as a secondary 
hypothesis that the subliminal facial primes would have no effect on the self-report 
ratings of current feelings of anger and sadness, and that the participants would not 
experience strong angry or sad feelings. Finding support for these hypotheses would 
indicate that emotion-specific appraisals can be automatically and unconsciously 




Facial primes were used as cues in the current study for several reasons. 
First, because emotional expressions have important communicative functions 
(Ekman, 1984), they approximate the social environment more closely than other 
stimuli, such as affective adjectives, when used as primes. Second, subliminally 
presented facial primes have been shown to be effective primes, producing predicted 
changes in many psychological and physical processes(De Gelder, 2005; Ravaja et 
al., 2004). For instance, researchers have found that evaluation of novel stimuli (e.g., 
Chinese ideographs) can be shaped by subliminally presented facial expressions, 
with happy faces tending to lead to more favourable evaluation and angry or sad 
faces to more negative evaluation (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Rotteveel, de Groot, 
Geutskens, & Phaf, 2001; Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997). Facial primes 
have been demonstrated to influence consumption behaviours. For example, 
Winkielman et al. (2005) found that thirsty participants consume a greater quantity 
of a beverage when they were subliminally primed with happy faces than with angry 
faces. Third, studies employing facial electromyographic measures have shown that 
individuals unintentionally and spontaneously mimic the facial expressions to which 
they are exposed, regardless of whether the facial expressions are presented within 
their range of consciousness (Dimberg, 1990; Dimberg, 1997; Dimberg, Thunberg, 
& Elmehed, 2000; Ichikawa & Makino, 2004). Thus, subliminal angry and sad faces 
would be expected to activate anger and sadness representations, respectively, which 
should in turn elicit related responses. 
Because asking close-ended questions (e.g., “To what extent is this event 
caused by another person?”) can prime and restrict participants’ responses, this 
means of measuring appraisal—the typical means of measuring appraisal in past 
studies—was not used in this research. Specifically, an appraisal that had never been 
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activated might be rated erroneously as present because participants were led by the 
wording of the item to mistakenly believe that an appraisal had been made. In 
contrast, open-ended items encourage response spontaneity and variability, allowing 
participants to more freely provide their appraisals with minimal contextual 
influence from close-ended items. The participants’ open-ended responses were 
coded and analyzed to determine whether they had made Agency-Others or Agency-
Situation appraisals. Similar methods were used to investigate a variety of 
constructs, such as stereotypes, positive emotions, and interpersonal behaviours 
(Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; Forgas, 1999; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & 
Jetten, 1994), and the same method was once employed to assess appraisals (Yap & 










Sixty-eight undergraduate students of Chinese ethnicity (52 females, mean 
age = 20.13, SD = 1.35) from the National University of Singapore (NUS) 
voluntarily participated in the study to earn one course credit. Half the participants 




Experiment 1 was a mixed-design study including one between-subject 
independent variable (IV) (Prime) with two levels (Anger Prime and Sadness Prime) 
and one within-subject IV (Agency) with two levels (Agency-Others and Agency-
Situation). The dependent variable (DV) was the number of Agency responses.  
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, each participant was assigned to a partitioned computer 
terminal in which she or he was seated approximately 50 cm from the computer 
screen. All tasks were administered on Dell X-series desktop computers with a 
monitor refresh rate of 75 Hz and an Intel GMA 3000 graphic card with memory 
capability up to 256 MB. The entire experiment was administered using DirectRT 
Precision Timing software (Jarvis, 2008). 
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The participants were told that they would participate in several unrelated 
studies. Although the first task was presented as an examination of their intuitive 
judgment of novel stimuli, in this case words in Korean, a language with which none 
of the participants was familiar, their responses to this task were not of interest, with 
the task only being used as means of covertly administering the facial primes. The 
participants were given a cover story to explain why they were asked to perform an 
apparently strange task. The participants were told that even if people could not 
understand a language, they could intuitively infer the meaning of words in a 
language that they did not know based on certain features, such as the shape of the 
characters and this study aimed to test the accuracy of such intuitive judgment. In 
each trial, the participants were presented with a Korean word composed of two 
characters and asked to indicate whether that word had a positive meaning or a 
negative meaning. After engaging in five practice trials, the participants engaged in 
50 main trials, all of which followed the same procedure.   
The priming procedure was based on a procedure that had been used in 
similar studies (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) adapted to fulfill the research 
objective. In each trial, the participants were told to focus on a fixation point (+) 
presented for 1000 ms at the centre of the computer screen, allegedly because the 
point signalled the start of a new trial and would help them to prepare for the coming 
stimulus. This instruction ensured that the participants were attending to the screen 
when the prime was presented. After the fixation point had been presented, a 
forward mask comprised of diagonal cross-hatches on a grey background was 
presented for 200 ms. Next, a facial prime was presented; across the 50 trials, half of 
the primes were male and half were female. Participants assigned to the Anger 
Prime condition were exposed only to angry facial expressions and those assigned to 
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the Sadness Prime condition were exposed only to sad facial expressions. The 
exposure time for the primes, which ranged from 26 ms to 28 ms, was determined 
by the 75 Hz monitor refresh rate and the video graphic card capability. The 
presentation of a facial prime was followed by the presentation of a backward mask 
comprised of a wall of “&” symbols distributed uniformly over a gray background 
presented for 200 ms.   
A Korean word (e.g., 의 자; see Appendix A for all Korean words) was then 
presented for 3000 ms2. In the meantime, the participants rated the word using a 
seven-point scale that ranged from 1 (extremely negative meaning) to 7 (extremely 
positive meaning) using the numerical keypad. After they had rated the word or 
3000 ms had elapsed, the next trial was activated. Each Korean word was presented 
only once across the 50 trials. Each word was presented for at most 3000 ms to 
prevent the participants from spending too much time on each trial. If the time spent 
on the priming procedure had varied widely across participants, the different 
temporal delays might have led to different strengths of the priming effect (Higgins, 
Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Kandel, 1976). The facial primes and Korean words were 
presented in a randomized manner across participants, as configured by DirectRT. 
After this priming procedure, the participants proceeded with the agency 
measure. In each of the 10 trials, the participants were presented with one sentence 
that described a hypothetical negative life event and asked to indicate what they 
thought was the most likely cause of each event in one brief sentence, with the event 
sentence remaining on the screen until they had responded. The participants were 
                                                            
2 Consistent with past studies, the chosen Korean words were affectively bland (e.g., Murphy & 
Zajonc, 1993). In a pilot study, a sample of twenty NUS undergraduates who did not participate in 
Experiment 1 rated each word on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (do not like the word at all) to 7 (like 
the word quite a bit). All ratings were not significantly different from the mid-point of the scale, all 
|t|s < 1.75, dfs = 19, ps > .05. 
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told that there were no right or wrong answers and that they should provide the first 
cause that came to mind. The 10 events were presented in random order across 
participants. After completing the agency measure, the participants were asked to 
rate how angry and sad they were at the moment and whether they could read 
Korean. All participants indicated that they could not read Korean.   
The debriefing held after the experiment indicated that none of the 
participants thought that the two tasks were related and that none had knowledge of 
the true research objective. The participants were then thanked and dismissed. 
 
Materials 
Facial primes. Past studies suggest that the ethnicity associated with facial 
primes should be taken into account (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Previous 
research has indicated that facial expressions of an ethnicity different from that of 
the perceiver can elicit incongruent affective reactions (e.g., fearful faces posed by 
black people can elicit positive, instead of negative emotional responses from 
Caucasians; Hugenberg, 2005; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008) or elicit unwanted 
stereotypic and prejudicial responses (Bargh et al., 1996; Devine, Plant, Amodio, 
Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). To avoid these 
possible confounds, only the faces of Chinese individuals were presented to the 
participants, who were all of Chinese ethnicity, and the widely used facial 
expressions constructed by Ekman and Friesen (1976) were not utilized because 
none of these faces were Chinese. Four Chinese facial expressions (an angry female 
expression, a sad female expression, an angry male expression, and a sad male 
expression) were constructed for the present investigation to serve as emotional 
primes (see Appendix B). Because the effect of gender of the facial primes was not 
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of interest in this research, the participants were exposed to an equal number of male 
and female faces. 
Agency measure. The 10 negative events used in the agency measure, shown 
in Appendix C, were derived from interviews with NUS students regarding their 
everyday experiences and problems in order to reflect common experiences to which 
undergraduates could relate.     
Reported emotion. Participants answered the questions “How angry are you 
feeling now?” and “How sad are you feeling now?” using a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).  
 
Pretesting of Awareness 
Past studies have indicated that an exposure time of 26 to 28 ms is too brief 
for most stimuli to be identified (e.g., Stapel et al., 2002)3. As the current research 
examined the effects of subliminally presented stimuli, two pilot studies were 
conducted to determine the visibility of the facial primes used in the priming 
procedure. 
Pilot Study A. Pilot Study A was designed to investigate whether the 
participants would be able to recognize the facial expressions in the priming 
procedure employed in the main experiment of Experiment 1. A sample of 33 
participants who did not participate in the main experiment was subjected to the 
same priming procedure administered in the main experiment. Sixteen participants, 
of whom eight were exposed to the male face and eight to the female face, were 
assigned to the Anger Prime condition, and seventeen participants, of whom nine 
                                                            
3 Despite this statement, I urge caution in making straightforward comparisons between studies in the 
visibility of inconspicuous primes. Whether a prime can be identified depends on many factors other 
than exposure times, such as the type of masks used, the type of primes presented, brightness of the 
experimental context, and the location of the prime on the computer screen. 
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were exposed to the male face and eight to the female face, to the Sadness Prime 
condition. After all 50 trials, the participants were presented with three alternatives 
(an angry face, a sad face, and a neutral face) of the same gender to which they had 
been previously exposed and asked to select the expression presented to them. 
Participants who claimed that they saw no facial expression during the priming 
procedure were instructed to make a guess. Six of the 16 participants in the Anger 
Prime condition and 4 of the 17 in the Sadness Prime condition selected the same 
expression as the face to which they had been previously exposed. As recognition 
performance across both conditions was not significantly different from chance 
(33%), χ2 = 0.14, p = .71, it was concluded that the priming procedure was effective 
in preventing participants from accurately and spontaneously identifying the facial 
primes. It was also concluded that, consistent with past research, individuals are 
generally unable to identify facial primes after an exposure time of about 30 ms 
(Tamir, Robinson, Clore, Martin, & Whitaker, 2004) 
Pilot Study B. The finding of Pilot Study A suggested that it would be 
unlikely that the participants in the main experiment could identify the facial primes. 
However, this finding only indicated whether individuals could identify the facial 
primes when did not forewarn of their existence and not explicitly instructed to 
identify them during the priming procedure. Whether individuals could identify the 
primes when forewarned about their existence and explicitly instructed to identify 
them should be examined, because of the possibility that some participants in the 
main experiment had made an effort to identify the prime. Hence, another sample of 
30 participants were subjected to basically the same priming procedure used in the 
main experiment but with several modifications. These participants were explicitly 
informed that a picture of a face would be presented briefly during each trial, with 
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no information regarding gender or emotional expression provided. In each of 24 
trials, the participants were exposed to an angry, a sad or a neutral facial prime after 
the removal of the backward mask (i.e., the “&” mask). After the removal of the 
facial prime, two faces were presented instead of a Korean word. This substitution 
was made because the main purpose of Pilot Study B was to test identification 
accuracy when there was a focused intention to identify the primes. The actual facial 
prime was presented on one side of the screen and a foil (i.e., a different expression 
of the same gender) was presented on the other side. The expression, gender, and 
location of the actual facial prime were balanced and randomized across 24 trials. 
The participants were asked to indicate which face they thought had been 
presented in that trial. Analysis of their responses indicated that their recognition 
performance was significantly better than chance (50%), t(29) = 6.04, p < .001 (two-
tailed), with the average number of correct identifications being 16.17 out of 24 
trials. Hence, if participants were forewarned of the primes and focused on detecting 
them, they could identify them reasonably well. However, the participants in the 
main experiment were instructed to focus on Korean words and were not informed 
of the primes. These two manipulations should successfully minimize the possibility 
of participants devoting attention and resources to identifying the primes (Li et al., 
2008). Therefore, the results of Pilot Study B did not indicate that the effects of the 
emotional primes on appraisals that Experiment 1 had tested were not subliminal, 
which can further be supported by the Rosen and Singh (1992) study on subliminal 
embeds4. The subliminal aspect of the primes of Experiment 1 did not arise from the 
fact that they were presented below the threshold of conscious perception but rather 
                                                            
4 “Subliminal embeds are usually clearly visible once pointed out but otherwise remain unnoticed by 
those who view the presented material” (Rosen & Singh, 1992, p.158). 
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from the fact that their presence and impact were not spontaneously recognized 
when they were presented (Rosen & Singh, 1992). 
 
Results 
Two trained coders who were blind to the experimental assignment 
categorized each of the 680 responses provided by the 68 participants into one of the 
two Agency categories of interest: the Agency-Others or the Agency-Situation 
category. Specifically, they coded a response indicating that the participant had 
appraised the event as caused by another person or other individuals as an Agency-
Others response and a response indicating that the participant had appraised the 
event as caused by non-human factors (e.g., the weather) as an Agency-Situation 
response. For example, for the item “The night out with your date went badly”, the 
response “He was boring” would be coded as an Agency-Others response whereas 
the response “Bad weather” would be coded as an Agency-Situation response. The 
inter-rater reliability found to be high (r = .83, p < .001). All discrepancies were 
resolved by a third coder also blind to experimental assignment. Respective 
responses were summed across all 10 event items to provide a composite Agency-
Others and an Agency-Situation score. Outliers of more than 2 SDs from the means 
were substituted with the respective average values. 
To recapitulate, it was hypothesized that participants in the Anger Prime 
condition would be more likely to attribute events to other individuals (Agency-
Others) and less likely to attribute events to impersonal situational factors (Agency-
Situation) than those in the Sadness Prime condition. The results of a 2 (Prime) × 2 
(Agency) mixed ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect of Prime and a 
non-significant main effect of Agency, ps > .27. However, the results indicated a 
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significant interaction effect between Prime and Agency, F(1, 66) = 13.07, p = .001, 
η2 = .17. Further analysis indicated that the number of Agency-Others responses (M 
= 2.21, SD = 1.43) was significantly higher in the Anger Prime condition than in the 
Sadness Prime condition (M = 1.53, SD = 0.99), t(66) = 2.27, p = .01 (one-tailed), d 
= 0.56, and that the number of Agency-Situation responses was significantly higher 
in the Sadness Prime condition (M = 1.97, SD = 1.19) than in the Anger Prime 
condition (M = 1.29, SD = 0.87), t(66) = 2.67, p = .005 (one-tailed), d = 0.66. Thus, 
the results supported the hypothesis. Figure 2.1 shows the effect of Anger Prime 
versus Sadness Prime on Agency-Others and Agency-Situation responses.   
 
Figure 2.1. Effect of Anger Prime versus Sadness Prime on the number of Agency-
Others and Agency-Situation responses in Experiment 1. 
 
On first observation, there appeared to be a number of responses attributing 
events to the self (Agency-Self). Hence, additional analyses were performed to 
examine the possible influence of the facial primes on Agency-Self, which is a third 
major form of agency appraisal. When the extent to which the events were attributed 
to the self (Agency-Self) was coded (e.g., an answer “I was in a bad mood” for the 
event “The night out with your date went badly”), the average number of Agency-

























1.64) in the Sadness Prime condition. Unexpectedly, more internal attributions were 
elicited than external (human and situation) attributions, all Fs > 24.23, ps < .001, η2 
> .425. Further analysis revealed no significant difference in Agency-Self as a 
function of Prime, F(1, 66) = 0.74, p = .39, η2 = .01.  
It can be seen in Figure 2.1 that the numbers of Agency-Others and Agency-
Situation responses were relatively low (the average numbers were below 2.3). As 
each participant only gave one response to each of the 10 events, and all 10 
responses were categorized into three kinds of appraisal agency (Agency-Other, 
Agency-Situation, or Agency-Self)6, the number of responses of each agency 
category was not expected to be high. However, the small numbers of responses 
posed a potential problem in that the reliability of the analysis might be reduced if 
the distributions of the Agency scores were too skewed to the right. However, the 
distributions of the Agency scores were actually normal, and even when they were 
subjected to an appropriate (square-root) transformation and then submitted to the 
same analysis, the results obtained were just as supportive of the hypothesis as those 
obtained from the raw scores.  
Finally, no effect was found for Prime on reported anger, t(66) = 0.41, p = 
.68, or reported sadness, t(66) = 0.67, p = .51. The reported emotion scores in the 
Anger Prime condition (reported anger, M = 2.35, SD = 1.25; reported sadness, M = 
2.62, SD = 1.52) and the Sadness Prime condition (reported anger, M = 2.24, SD = 




5 Because the present study did not attempt to examine differences between internal and external 
attributions, this issue is not discussed in the current paper. 
6 Several participants also gave invalid or irrelevant responses that could not be categorized into any 
of these three appraisal agencies.  
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Experiment 1 provided initial support for the automatic emotion-specific 
appraisal effect by supporting the hypothesis that automatically activated emotion-
representations should affect the corresponding appraisals in a manner predicted by 
appraisal theories. Specifically, the results consistently revealed that participants 
were more likely to appraise negative events as caused by other individuals when 
they were unconsciously exposed to angry facial primes than when they were 
exposed to sad facial primes. Conversely, they were more likely to appraise the 
same events as caused by impersonal situational factors when they were primed with 
sad faces than with angry faces. Moreover, the anger and sadness prime 
manipulation only affected appraisals associated with anger (Agency-Others) and 
sadness (Agency-Situation) but not unrelated appraisals (Agency-Self). The low 
levels of reported anger and sadness suggested that none of these emotions were 
strongly felt. Moreover, the reported anger and sadness did not affect by anger and 
sadness primes.  
Other researchers might consider this study’s finding that appraisals were 
affected by subliminally presented facial primes without any corresponding change 
in emotional experience as a function of the Prime condition as evidence of 
unconscious emotion (for review, see Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Wiens & 
Ohman, 2007). Based on this position, it is possible that unconscious emotions were 
induced in the current experiment. This speculation makes the low levels of reported 
anger and sadness understandable, as the method of self-report may not have been 
sufficiently sensitive or inappropriate for testing unconscious emotions (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). 
Although the results of Experiment 1 appear to support the hypothesis, they 
should be deemed as tentatively supporting it due to several unresolved issues. 
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Although Pilot Study A and other past studies using facial primes at exposure time 
of about 30 ms (e.g., Li et al., 2008; Tamir et al., 2004) found that participants were 
unable to spontaneously identify the primes if they were not forewarned of their 
presence, Pilot Study B indicated that the facial primes presented at 26-to-28 ms 
might be identifiable if participants were told to focus on detecting them. Moreover, 
no data on whether the primes were recognized by the participants in the main 
experiment were collected. Thus, it remains unclear how much the subliminal effect 
of facial primes on appraisal obtained was unconsciously elicited. Hence, to verify 
that the effect was indeed subliminal, Experiment 2 employed an even shorter 
exposure timeframe of 16-to-18 ms. 
Because only negative events were examined in Experiment 1, it was unclear 
whether the same effects would occur with agency appraisals of positive events. 
Keltner et al. (1993; Study I and V) found that consciously experienced anger and 
sadness influenced agency appraisals of negative events but not of positive events, 
suggesting that emotions are more likely to influence appraisals of events of 
congruent valence. Drawing from their findings, it was predicted that subliminally 
presented angry and sad facial primes would influence Agency-Others and Agency-









To address the concerns that arose during Experiment 1, several changes to 
the experimental design were made in Experiment 2. First, the exposure time of the 
facial primes was decreased to 16 to 18 ms, with the same Prime × Agency 
interaction effect expected even with this extremely short exposure timeframe. To 
further ensure that the effect was subliminal, data were collected during the 
debriefing procedure regarding whether the participants in the main experiment had 
observed the primes. Second, positive events were examined in addition to the 
negative events examined in Experiment 1. Drawing from Keltner et al. (1993), it 
was anticipated that the predicted Prime × Agency interaction effect would occur 
with the negative events but not with the positive events.  
Lastly, all the participants were undergraduate students from Mainland China 
rather than students from Singapore. This change in participant nationality was made 
in order to examine the factors behind the unexpectedly small numbers of Agency-
Others and Agency-Situation responses in Experiment 1. If the same findings could 
be replicated within a different cultural context, the evidence for the hypothesized 
unconscious emotion-specific effects on appraisals of agency would be 
strengthened. Although both China and Singapore are typically classified as 
collectivistic cultures, they differ in numerous ways, such as philosophical outlook, 
cultural values, and personal goals (Lau, 1992), as well as historical development 
and political culture. There are thus a sufficient number of differences between 
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China and Singapore to provide an initial but substantive test of the cross-cultural 
consistency of the results.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twelve students (104 females, mean age = 20.45, SD = 
1.22) from the Tangshan Vocational Technical College in China volunteered to 
participate after appeals for participants were made during their lectures. Half the 
participants were randomly assigned to the Anger Prime condition and half to the 
Sadness Prime condition. 
 
Design 
Experiment 2 was a mixed-design study that included one between-subject 
IV (Prime) with two levels (Anger Prime and Sadness Prime), and two within-
subject IVs: that of Agency at two levels (Agency-Others and Agency-Situation) 
and that of Event at two levels (Positive Event and Negative Event). The dependent 
variable was the number of responses in each agency category. 
 
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure and materials used in Experiment 2 differed from those in 
Experiment 1 in four respects. First, the exposure time of the facial primes was 
reduced to between 16 ms and 18 ms, as determined by the computer equipment 
used. This study was conducted using an Acer Aspire notebook computer with a 
monitor refresh rate of 60 Hz and an ATI Mobility Radeon X1600 video graphic 
card with 128 MB memory capability. Second, Experiment 2 was conducted in 
Mandarin, which is the dominant language of the Mainland Chinese participants. 
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Back-translation was performed to ensure that all instructions and measurement 
materials were semantically equivalent across the two samples in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. Third, new positive events based on interviews with undergraduates 
with regard to everyday events that they commonly encounter were constructed and 
included. Fourth, two of the negative events from Experiment 1were omitted from 
Experiment 2 due to the results of a pretest with a different sample of 20 Chinese 
participants that indicated ceiling effects with these two events. Specifically, 90% of 
the participants responded to the event item “Your personal belongings were lost 
while travelling overseas” by attributing it to theft, and 75% thought that the event 
item “You missed a movie that you wanted to watch” was impossible. Although 
these unexpected findings are interesting, suggesting potential cross-cultural 
differences in how different events are attributed, these items were omitted due to 
concerns that they might not be appropriate for testing the study hypothesis. In 
addition, because positive events were included in Experiment 2, the participants in 
Experiment 2 were required to respond to more events than had the participants in 
Experiment 1 and thus faced the risk of fatigue effects and the diminishing effects of 
the facial primes with time. Thus, only eight negative events and eight positive 
events were examined, as shown in Appendix D. 
All other aspects of the procedure and materials remained identical to those 
in Experiment 1. Hence, in Korean-word rating task, participants assigned to the 
Anger Prime condition were exposed to angry faces (half of which were male and 
half female) 50 times, and those assigned to the Sadness Prime condition were 
exposed to sad faces (half of which were male and half female) 50 times. After 
completing the Korean-word rating task, the participants completed the agency 
measure and then the responded to the same self-reported emotion items.  
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A debriefing conducted at the end of the study revealed that no participants 
could read Korean, none thought that the tasks were related, and none had 
knowledge of the research objective. When the participants were asked whether they 
had seen any faces during the priming task and, if so, what the faces’ emotional 
expression had been (see funnelling debriefing procedure by Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000), four of the 56 participants in the Anger Prime condition and nine of the 56 
participants in the Sadness Prime condition reported having seen something 
resembling faces but none could correctly identify their facial expressions.  
 
Pretesting of Awareness 
Pilot Study C. As in Experiment 1, two pilot studies were conducted to 
assess awareness of the facial primes. Pilot Study C was identical to Pilot Study A 
except that the exposure time of the facial primes was reduced to 16 to 18 ms. Ten 
participants were exposed to the angry facial primes, of whom five were exposed to 
the angry male face and five to the angry female face, and 10 participants were 
exposed to the sad facial primes, of whom five were exposed to the sad male face 
and five to the sad female face. After all 50 trials, the participants indicated which of 
three faces (an angry face, a sad face, or a neutral face, all of the same gender as that 
presented to them during the 50 trials) that they thought had been presented to them. 
Only three participants in the Anger Prime condition and one in the Sadness Prime 
condition identified the prime correctly. As recognition performance across both 
conditions was not higher than chance (33%), the results indicate that primes 
presented for 16 to 18 ms are extremely difficult to identify correctly if participants 
are not forewarned of their presence, which is consistent with the finding that none 
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of the participants in the main experiment of Experiment 2 could correctly identify 
the facial expressions. 
Pilot Study D. As was Pilot Study B in Experiment 1, Pilot Study D was 
conducted to assess whether the participants could correctly identify the primes if 
forewarned of their presence and explicitly instructed to identify them, but after an 
exposure time of only 16 to 18 ms. Twenty-four trials were administered in the same 
two-alternative, forced-choice recognition task. However, unlike the participants in 
Pilot Study B, the current participants were unable to identify the primes. 
Recognition performance was not significantly higher than the chance (50%), t(19) 
= 1.05, p = .31(two-tailed), and the average number of correct identifications was 
12.60 (out of 24 trials).   
In sum, Pilot Studies C and D indicate that the participants were unable to 
correctly identify facial primes presented for 16 to 18 ms; even if they deliberately 
focused their attention on the primes, their recognition performance was still not 
higher than chance level. Moreover, the differences in recognition performance 
between Pilot Study B and Pilot Study D suggest that changing the prime duration 




Two coders who were blind to the experimental assignment coded the 1,792 
responses from all the participants into the same Agency-Others and Agency-
Situation categories as the responses in Experiment 1 had been coded. The inter-
rater reliability was high (r = .94, p < .001) and all discrepancies were resolved by a 
third coder also blind to the experimental assignment. The responses were summed 
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to produce Agency-Others and Agency-Situation scores, and outliers of more than 2 
SDs from the means were substituted with the respective average values. 
To recapitulate, the hypothesis posited that the differential effects of anger 
and sadness primes on Agency-Others and Agency-Situation should be found only 
in the Negative Event condition and not in the Positive Event condition. A 2 (Prime) 
× 2 (Agency) × 2 (Event) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Prime, F(1, 110) = 9.91, p = .002, η2 = .08, a significant main effect of Agency, F(1, 
110) = 7.54, p = .007, η2 = .06, and a marginally significant main effect of Event, 
F(1, 110) = 7.54, p = .06, η2 = .06. More relevant to the hypothesis, the analysis 
identified a significant two-way interaction between Prime and Agency, F(1, 110) = 
19.63, p < .001, η2 = .15, which was qualified by a significant three-way interaction, 
F(1, 110) = 4.35, p = .04, η2 = .04 (see Figure 3.1). The interaction between Agency 
and Event was significant, F(1, 110) = 50.87, p < .001, η2 = .32, but the interaction 
between Prime and Event was not, F(1, 110) = .12, p = .69, η2 = .001. Although all 
the main effects and interaction effects were interesting, only those that directly 
related to the hypothesis were further analyzed and discussed. 
 


































Because the three-way interaction was found to be significant, further 
analysis was conducted to examine the critical Prime × Agency interaction within 
each Event condition. Consistent with the predictions, a significant Prime × Agency 
interaction was found in the Negative Event condition, F(1, 110) = 41.23, p < .001, 
η2 = .27. Further analysis indicated that in the Negative Event condition, the number 
of Agency-Others responses was significantly larger in the Anger Prime condition 
(M = 1.33, SD = 1.08) than in the Sadness Prime condition (M = 0.91, SD = 0.70), 
t(110) = 2.49, p = .007 (one-tailed), d = 0.47, and the number of Agency-Situation 
responses was larger in the Sadness Prime condition (M = 1.95, SD = 0.71) than the 
Anger Prime condition (M = 1.11, SD = 0.64), t(110) = 6.56, p < .001 (one-tailed), d 
= 1.25. Hence, the findings of Experiment 1 were replicated using a shorter priming 
timeframe and a different cultural sample (shown in the left portion of Figure 3.1). 
However, no significant Prime × Agency interaction was found in the 
Positive Event condition, F(1, 110) = 5.05, p = .16, η2 = .02. The pattern of Agency-
Others and Agency-Situation responses in the Positive Event condition was not 
consistent with the hypothesized emotion-specific effects (see the right portion of 
Figure 3.1). No significant main effect of Prime on Agency-Others was found, F(1, 
66) = 0.04, p = .83, η2 = .001, and Agency-Situation, F(1, 66) = 2.90, p = .09, η2 = 
.04 in the Positive Event condition. Therefore, as predicted, the facial primes 
affected only appraisals of events of the same valence.  
Consistent with Experiment 1, the distributions of the Agency scores were 
normal, despite the small number of Agency-Others and Agency-Situation 
responses. Hence, no transformation was needed, and even if the data had been 
transformed and re-analysed, the results remained similar. The average number of 
Agency-Self responses generated for the negative events was 4.04 (SD = 1.56) in the 
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Anger Prime condition and 3.71 (SD = 1.37) in the Sadness Prime condition, 
whereas the average number of Agency-Self responses generated for the positive 
events was 4.43 (SD = 1.04) in the Anger Prime condition and 4.20 (SD = 1.41) in 
the Sadness Prime condition. Hence, the Chinese participants in Experiment 2 were 
more likely to attribute both negative and positive events to the self than to external 
factors (other individuals or impersonal situations) in both prime conditions, all Fs > 
56.51, ps < .001, η2 > .51. A 2 (Prime) × 2 (Event) mixed ANOVA of Agency-Self 
responses identified a significant main effect of Event, F(1, 110) = 5.60, p = .02, η2 
= .05, which indicated a greater number of Agency-Self responses in the Positive 
Event condition than in the Negative Event condition. As there was no significant 
main effect of Prime, F(1, 110) = 2.41, p = .12, η2 = .02, or significant interaction 
effect, F(1, 110) = 0.06, p = .81, η2 = .001, on Agency-Self, it can be concluded that 
the Prime manipulation had no effect on Agency-Self responses across both types of 
events.  
As in Experiment 1, reported emotion scores in the Anger Prime condition 
(reported anger, M = 2.32, SD = 1.49; reported sadness, M = 2.23, SD = 1.53) and 
the Sadness Prime condition (reported anger, M = 1.91, SD = 1.44; reported sadness, 
M = 2.00, SD = 1.61) were low (note that the mid-point was 4). The results of a 2 
(Prime) × 2 (Reported Emotion) mixed ANOVA indicated no significant interaction 
F (1, 110) = 0.44, p = .51. Because neither the main effect of Reported Emotion, 
F(1, 110) = 0.00, p = 1.00, nor the main effect of Prime, F(1, 110) = 1.61, p = .21, 
was significant, it can be concluded that self-reported anger and sadness did not vary 






Experiment 2 provided further support to the hypothesis that subliminally 
presented emotional primes could automatically and systematically affect agency 
appraisals of events, but only of those events whose valence was consistent with that 
of the primes. Specifically, when participants were subliminally primed with angry 
facial primes, they were more likely to appraise negative events as caused by other 
individuals, whereas when they were subliminally primed with sad facial primes, 
they were more likely to appraise negative events as caused by impersonal 
situational factors. In line with previous studies that found that consciously 
experienced negative emotions could shape causal judgments to negative events but 
not positive events (Keltner et al., 1993), the anger and sadness primes influenced 
the appraisals of negative events but not of positive events. Similar valence-specific 
effects have been found in other subliminal priming studies (Kivikangas & Ravaja, 
2009; Ravaja et al., 2004) in which negative primes only influenced the evaluation 
of negative messages and positive primes only influenced the evaluation of positive 
messages. The findings of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 by 
indicating that no strong feelings of anger or sadness had been experienced and that 
the Prime had not affected the self-reported emotion ratings. 
One reason why the participants were more inclined to appraise themselves 
as the causes of positive events than of negative events could be a self-serving bias 
(Brown & Rogers, 1991; Krusemark, Campbell, & Clementz, 2008), which 
encouraged them to take responsibility for positive outcomes but not undesired 
negative outcomes. This tendency may also be one of the reasons why emotional 
primes only influenced appraisals of negative events: As individuals tend to make 
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internal attributions to positive outcomes, appraisals of positive events were unlikely 






volutionary theorists consider emotions to be an adaptive system whose aim 
is to respond to environmental challenges (for review, see Keltner & Gross, 1999). 
For such an adaptive system to function optimally, individuals must be capable of 
reacting automatically to stimuli important to survival, which requires that the 
emotional system rapidly processes incoming stimuli and be sufficiently sensitive to 
discriminate among fine differences in stimuli to activate a tailored response to a 
particular stimulus. An extrapolation of this concept is that the emotional system 
should have the capacity to extract the subtle differences between an anger-related 
stimulus and a sadness-related stimulus, even if these stimuli are presented at levels 
below consciousness, and then automatically activate cognitive functions associated 
with these emotions. However, no clear evidence of unconscious emotion-specific 
cognitive effects has been definitively identified, although evidence of conscious 
emotion-specific cognitive effects and unconscious valence-based cognitive effects 
has been identified. The current research aimed at filling this research gap by 
examining the unconscious specific effects of emotional primes on agency 
appraisals. 
 
Summary of the Findings 
Experiment 1 provided preliminary evidence of automatic emotion-specific 
effects on cognitive processes. Subliminally presenting angry or sad facial primes to 
the participants influenced their subsequent appraisals of unrelated events in a 
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manner beyond a simple valence-based evaluation. Specifically, participants briefly 
primed with angry faces were more likely to attribute negative events to other 
individuals than those who were primed with sad faces. In contrast, participants 
briefly primed with sad faces were more likely to attribute the negative events to 
impersonal situational factors than those primed with angry faces. Notably, these 
observed effects were not only emotion specific but also appraisal specific. 
According to appraisal theories (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985), angry and sad facial primes should only facilitate agency appraisals to others 
and situational factors, respectively, and not to the self (except in the case of self-
anger which is strongly associated with Agency-Self; Ellsworth & Tong, 2006). 
Consistently, the facial primes did not affect the extent to which the participants 
attributed the events to the self, only the extent to which the same events were 
attributed to others and situations. Moreover, no participants reported strong 
conscious feelings of anger or sadness after being exposed to the facial primes, a 
finding in accord with past studies that also found that subliminally presented primes 
affected evaluations or behaviours but not emotional feelings (e.g., Ric, 2004; Ruys 
& Stapel, 2008a; Ruys & Stapel, 2008b; Winkielman et al., 2005; Zemack-Rugar et 
al., 2007).  
Although Pilot Study A verified that the priming procedure was effective in 
preventing participants from becoming aware of the facial primes when instructed to 
focus on the Korean words rating and not forewarned of the primes, the findings 
should be viewed with caution, as the priming still might not have been fully 
subliminal. When the participants in Pilot Study B had been forewarned of the 
primes and instructed to detect them, they were able to correctly identify the primes 
at a level above that of chance. This finding suggests that the observed effects of 
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emotional primes on appraisals might not be fully unconscious if participants make a 
deliberate effort at identifying the primes. 
By exposing participants from a different culture to the primes for a briefer 
period to preclude their awareness of the primes, Experiment 2 provided stronger 
evidence of the hypothesized automatic and unconscious emotion-specific cognitive 
effects. Pilot Study D verified that the exposure time of the facial primes in 
Experiment 2 had been too brief to allow for identification, even when the 
participants had been explicitly forewarned of their presence. Experiment 2 fully 
replicated the results of Experiment 1, further supporting that emotional stimuli can 
have a robust emotion-specific effect on appraisals. However, as the two negative 
emotional primes affected agency appraisals of negative events but not agency 
appraisals of positive events, the reasons for this valence-specific influence should 
be further investigated.   
 
Theoretical Importance of the Findings 
The current work extends the literature on the impact of affect on cognition 
and the research into appraisal theories of emotion. First, the majority of studies that 
have investigated the impact of unconscious emotional priming on cognitive 
functions identified only valence-based effects but not emotion-specific effects 
(Chartrand et al., 2006). In particular, many found that attitudinal evaluations tend to 
be more positive after exposure to subliminally presented positive primes than 
negative primes, and vice versa. However, studies that identified emotion-specific 
effects on cognitive functions examined only the effects of consciously experienced 
emotions and not whether these effects could be elicited by subliminally presented 
primes (Keltner et al., 1993).  
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The current research aligns these studies by providing evidence of the 
existence of unconscious emotion-specific cognitive effects. Specifically, this study 
found that individuals’ attributions to other individuals (Agency-Others appraisals) 
were facilitated by subliminally primed angry faces and that attributions to 
impersonal situations (Agency-Situation appraisals) were facilitated by subliminally 
primed sad faces. It should be noted that the affected cognitive process (the 
appraisal) in the current research is essentially different from the valence-based 
evaluations (positive vs. negative) that had been examined as dependent valuables in 
most previous investigations of the impact of affect on cognition. More cognitive 
resources are needed for complex causal appraisals than for judgments regarding 
likability, especially regarding targets that are novel and ambiguous, as the latter 
could simply be based on “pure feeling” and not require any analytic thinking. The 
findings of the current study suggest that subliminal emotional priming is capable of 
influencing complex cognitive processes (such as appraisal) that require elaborative 
conscious control.  
The findings of this research also contribute to appraisal theories research in 
two additional ways. These findings not only provide further evidence of the impact 
of emotions on appraisals predicted by appraisal theories (Keltner et al., 1993; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000) but also indicate that angry and sad stimuli can 
automatically impact agency appraisals, even when strong feelings of anger or 
sadness are absent. In both experiments, the levels of reported anger and sadness 
activated by subliminally presented facial primes were very low, consistent with 
data obtained from naturalistic event sampling studies in which participants were at 
baseline (neutral) emotional states (Tong et al., 2007). Although there was no 
indication of feelings of strong anger or sadness among the participants, the 
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participants in both experiments exhibited particular patterns of agency appraisals as 
a function of the facial primes in a manner predicted by appraisal theories. The fact 
that emotion-specific information distinct to the facial expressions was 
unintentionally and unconsciously extracted, producing significant changes in 
appraisals even in the absence of strong feelings of the corresponding emotions, 
indicates that significant changes in related appraisals do not require corresponding 
changes in conscious emotional experiences. 
This research used a fairly new method of measuring appraisals. Most 
studies have measured appraisals by asking participants to rate self-reported 
appraisal items, such as the item “How much is this event caused by situational 
factors?” (Keltner et al., 1993), a method that has notable advantages as well as 
limitations. First, any ambiguity in the meaning of the items (e.g., the term 
situational factors could be interpreted in different ways by different participants) 
would be a source of measurement error. Second, responses to these items may not 
reflect actual experiences but schematic theories of appraisals and emotions 
(Parkinson, 1997). Third, a question such as “How much is this event caused by 
situational factors?” lacks ecological validity because individuals typically attribute 
events to concrete causes rather than general and abstract concepts (e.g., “situational 
factors”). Fourth, the items may prime inaccurate responses. As shown in this 
research, the participants attributed few events to other individuals or impersonal 
situational factors; thus, not every appraisal is appropriate in any given situation 
(Scherer, 1997). The wording of an appraisal testing item could subtly but 
incorrectly lead participants to infer that an appraisal had been made when it had 
truly not been. Moreover, participants may have inferred from the wording of the 
items that the purpose of the study was to investigate their attribution of agency. 
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On the other hand, allowing participants to make appraisals in an open-ended 
format allows them to respond more spontaneously and uninhibitedly, free from 
contextual influences within the measurement items. This method of assessing 
appraisals not only allows researchers to assess whether hypothesized appraisals are 
activated but also explore whether unanticipated appraisals are made, such as the 
great number of unanticipated Agency-Self appraisals made in this study. Although 
the method of allowing participants spontaneously stating opinion is comparatively 
new in appraisal research (Yap & Tong, 2009), it has been widely used in assessing 
a variety of variables, including stereotypic thoughts (Macrae et al., 1994), request 
strategies (Forgas, 1999), and deliberative and implemental mind-sets (Gollwitzer, 
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990). Taken together, previous research appears to provide 
considerable evidence in favour of the validity and reliability of this method. 
However, it should also be noted that this method has limitations, which is that the 
extent to which an appraisal can be coded from open-ended response depends on the 
complexity of the appraisal and the nature and length of the responses (Yap & Tong, 
2009).   
 
Study Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of the current research is that participants in both Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2 were mostly females. As previous studies have found that 
females are more facially reactive to facial expressions than males (Dimberg, 1982, 
1990), there may be gender difference in this study that future studies should 
explore.  
More research is needed to clarify the mechanism by which subliminally 
primed facial expressions elicit different appraisal tendencies. It is plausible that this 
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mechanism may be linked to the human capacity to unintentionally mimic facial 
expressions. Indeed, research has provided empirical evidence that individuals can 
unintentionally and spontaneously mimic other individuals’ facial expressions 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992; Stel, Van Den 
Heuvel, & Smeets, 2008). Further, subliminally presented facial expressions have 
been found to induce emotion-congruent physiological and neural reactions (De 
Gelder, 2005; Phillips et al., 2004). Researchers have also demonstrated that 
instructing participants to produce facial expressions by manipulating their facial 
muscles could induce emotional feelings that match the expressions (Duclos et al., 
1989; Flack, 2006; Schallhorn & Lunde, 1999). Thus, it is possible that facial 
primes, even those presented at subliminal levels, could result in spontaneous and 
unintentional mimicry of the expressions, which in turn could activate emotionally 
congruent responses, including those pertaining to appraisals. However, empirical 
investigation is required to provide direct evidence supporting the proposition that 
the participants in the current research actually mimicked the subliminally presented 
facial expressions before any conclusion can be made. 
This study only examined the specific automatic effects of two negative 
emotional cues (i.e., angry and sad facial expressions) on agency appraisals. It is 
important for future studies to investigate the automatic effects of other emotions on 
other appraisal dimensions. For example, fear is associated with a greater tendency 
to appraise a situation as uncertain compared to anger (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Thus, subliminally presented fear-related information 
may automatically lead individuals to perceive more risk in subsequent situations 
than subliminally presented anger-related information. In addition, the appraisal 
dimension of Control is known to differ between gratitude and pride (Ortony et al., 
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1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Hence, subliminally presented gratitude-related 
stimuli may result in appraisals of lower control than subliminally presented pride-
related stimuli. 
Future research could also extend the present research by examining how 
subliminally presented cues affect other components of the emotion system, besides 
cognitive processes in a parallel manner. Recent studies have consistently 
demonstrated that behaviours such as drinking and helping are affected by not only 
subliminally presented valence-based primes (Winkielman et al., 2005) but also 
subliminally presented emotion-specific primes. For example, Zemack-Rugar et al. 
(2007) found that individuals subliminally primed with guilt-related words 
subsequently demonstrated more helping behaviours than those who were 
subliminally primed with sadness-related words. It remains unclear whether and 
how subliminally presented emotion-specific stimuli affect action tendencies, 
autonomic responses, and communicative responses, as well as how strongly various 
components are organized as a function of such emotional primes. 
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study provide support to the proposition that 
subliminally presented emotional primes can activate emotion-specific cognitive 
responses, and thus demonstrate the sensitivity of the human emotional system. 
Specifically, the results indicate that the human emotional system can differentiate 
and process information associated with specific emotions at unconscious levels. 
The cognitive consequences of such subliminal effects are not restricted to simple 
valence-based evaluations but also more complex appraisals. Further, these reactions 
can occur outside of conscious awareness and without the experience of strong 
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subjective emotional feelings, as they only require that corresponding emotion 
representations be activated, even unconsciously. The present research enriches the 
literature regarding appraisal theories of emotion and provides possible directions 
for future investigations that could further develop these theories to gain better 
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Appendix A: Korean words used in the priming procedure in Experiment 1 and 2 
Korean 
words meanings   
Korean 
words meanings 
의자 ( chair ) 공기 ( air ) 
시계 ( watch ) 섬유 ( fiber ) 
베개 ( pillow ) 토지 ( land ) 
마루 ( floor ) 문제 ( question ) 
모자 ( hat ) 테마 ( theme ) 
보틀 ( bottle ) 안경 ( glasses ) 
도어    ( door ) 전화  ( telephone ) 
왼쪽 ( left ) 텐트 ( tent ) 
커튼  ( curtain ) 숫자 ( number ) 
램프   ( lamp ) 원인 ( cause ) 
거울 ( mirror ) 결과  ( result ) 
모래 ( sand ) 머신 ( machine ) 
타올 ( towel ) 건물 ( building ) 
칫솔 ( toothbrush ) 키친 ( kitchen ) 
박스 ( box ) 봉투 ( envelope ) 
신문  ( newspaper ) 언어 ( language ) 
연필  ( pencil ) 평면 ( plane ) 
트럭 ( truck ) 지도 ( map ) 
로프 ( rope ) 재료 ( material ) 
시간 ( time ) 날씨 ( weather ) 
공간 ( space ) 장소 ( place ) 
셔츠 ( shirt ) 지붕 ( roof ) 
비누 ( soap ) 소리 ( voice ) 
네트 ( net ) 화상 ( picture ) 
시장 ( market )   보행 ( walk ) 
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Appendix C: Events used in Experiment 1 
Your personal belongings were lost while travelling overseas. 
You did not do as well in a graded assignment as you expected. 
The night out with your date went badly. 
Your team members met each other for the first time, but you could not 
contribute to the conversation. 
You bought a product you did not really need. 
You had a quarrel with a loved one (family member/friend). 
You lost contact with your friend. 
You missed a movie that you wanted to watch. 
You did not get along with your team mate. 




Appendix D: Events used in Experiment 2 
You did not do as well in a graded assignment as you expected. 
The night out with your date went badly. 
Your team members met each other for the first time, but you could not 
contribute to the conversation. 
You bought a product you did not really need. 
You had a quarrel with a loved one (family member/friend). 
You lost contact with your friend. 
You did not get along with your team mate. 
Your contribution to your work went unrecognized. 
You had extra allowances for the month. 
You found a book you always wanted. 
A very bad habit of yours was kicked. 
You received a treat from your friend. 
You did a project that was highly praised. 
You were nominated as the leader of a group project. 
A cold war with your good friend finally ended. 
You met a friend and he/she complimented on your appearance. 
 
 
 
 
